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0. 
Notice the hyphen in my title. It indicates that Jason 
Stanley’s How Propaganda Works2 has the potential to re-
invigorate democracy by providing a non-moralistic case for it, 
not that it makes us lose confidence in democracy. And that is 
one reason why this is an important book: in my reading, it is a 
contribution to the realist revival in political philosophy,3 
insofar as it defends non-trivial normative conclusions 
without recourse to moral values external to politics. There 
are other reasons too. The book helps reviving ideology 
critique, thus broadening the scope of scope of Anglo-
American political philosophy. And it does so by combining 
tools from analytic epistemology and philosophy of language 
with current empirical results in psychology and other social 
sciences—an achievement that shows the untapped potential 
of presumptively apolitical fields of philosophy and reclaims 
political philosophy’s traditional haunt between facts and 
values from the rarefied purely normative terrain where its 
Anglo-American mainstream consigned it over the past few 
decades — or from moralism, as political realists would say. 
The book’s core argument can be crudely and 
provisionally summarised as follows. Democratic societies 
require substantial material equality because inequality 
causes ideologically flawed belief, which, in turn, make 
demagogic propaganda more effective. And that is 
problematic for the quality of democracy. 
In what follows I will unpack that argument, in order to 
make two points: (a) the non-moral argument for equality is 
promising, but weakened by its reliance on a heavily 
moralised conception of democracy; (b) that problem may be 
remedied by whole-heartedly embracing a more realistic 
conception of democracy. That conception is at least 
compatible with Stanley’s argument, if not implicit in parts of 
it. 
 
1. 
The extremely condensed summary of Stanley’s argument 
in the previous section indicates that it has a normative 
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conclusion—a defence of egalitarian democracy—supported 
by conceptual as well as empirical considerations. And one 
may reasonably infer that moral considerations play a role 
there too (as I argue in the next section), though I will try to 
show that they need not play a role (as I argue in the final 
section). For now I will just set the stage by outlining those 
considerations and the way in which they fit together. Here is 
a slightly more formal presentation of the core argument.4 
P1: Material inequality causes ideologically 
flawed belief. 
P2: Ideologically flawed belief makes 
demagoguery—a species of propaganda—
effective. 
P3: Demagoguery is problematic for the quality 
of democracy. 
C: Material inequality is problematic for the 
quality of democracy. 
I take it that the argument is straightforwardly valid, so we 
should focus on the content of the premises. It should be fairly 
clear that the first two premises will require support from 
epistemology, philosophy of language, and social-science. The 
third one does too, as well as from political philosophy, and 
that is why the word ‘quality’ there may raise some eyebrows, 
especially as it is deployed in close proximity to the word 
‘democracy’. We noted earlier that one of the distinctive 
features of Stanley’s argument for equality is that it is non-
moral, yet mention of the quality of democracy may point to 
moral commitments. We will turn to that issue later. For now 
let us focus on the first two premises, just to give a sense of the 
argument’s scope. I cannot do justice to Stanley’s resourceful 
interdisciplinary argumentation here, so I will limit myself to a 
bare, indeed partial outline of his case for each of the first two 
premises. 
The first premise combines empirical material from social 
psychology and other social sciences with a novel account of 
flawed ideology that draws on Stanley and others’ recent work 
in epistemology and cognate fields, especially the philosophy 
of mind. The starting point is a familiar one. The social 
structures and practices in which we live are tied up with our 
social identities, and (some of) our beliefs result from the 
interaction of social structures and social identities. Those are 
ideological beliefs, in a neutral sense of the term. Stanley then 
moves on to argue that flawed social structures—specifically, 
anti-egalitarian social structures—generate flaws in some of 
our ideological beliefs. Flawed ideological beliefs, according to 
Stanley, are beliefs that are resistant to rational revision: 
“difficult to abandon false belief[s] the presence of which 
hinders the acquisition of knowledge.” (199) The key move 
here is to flesh out resistance to rational revision as “a purely 
epistemic notion of flaw” (180), so that the link between 
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inequality and flawed ideology does not depend on a prior 
negative moral judgment on inequality. For our present 
purposes we can grant this point, which in any case is a 
persuasive one.   
The second premise, which we can similarly grant, rests on 
an analysis of the concept of propaganda, and particularly of 
what Stanley calls ‘undermining propaganda’: “Undermining 
propaganda by its nature undermines a political ideal. It 
undermines a political ideal by using it to communicate a 
message that is inconsistent with it.” (57) That is to say, 
undermining propaganda uses an ideal against itself. 
Demagoguery—which we will analyse in the discussion of the 
third premise—is a species of undermining propaganda. For 
now it will suffice to highlight Stanley’s claim that 
undermining propaganda “is able to achieve the task [of 
undermining ideals it ostensibly supports] by exploiting 
already existing flawed ideological belief, and even contributing 
to the formation of such belief. It is flawed ideological belief that 
masks the contradictions of undermining propaganda … by 
erecting difficult epistemic obstacles to recognizing tendencies 
of goals to misalign with certain ideals” (Ibid., emphasis in 
original). That claim also relies on results from traditionally 
non-political areas of philosophy and from social science. We 
cannot probe those results or their combination here, but it is 
important to notice that no moral commitments are required 
to establish this premise either. 
The third premise is in need of most clarification, given its 
normative claim, which is then carried through to the 
conclusion. I will parse that normative claim over the next two 
sections. 
 
2. 
In what sense, exactly, is demagoguery problematic for the 
quality of democracy? If that sounds like a loaded question, 
that is because it is. The suggestion here is that Stanley may 
have smuggled some moral commitment into an ostensibly 
non-moral argument. I take for granted, for now, that 
advancing a non-moral argument for egalitarianism is a 
desideratum here, but I will say something more about why 
that is so in the next section.  
Stanley argues that within democracies,5 a specific kind of 
undermining propaganda is most deleterious: “The kind of 
propaganda that is most threatening to liberal democracy is a 
species of undermining propaganda we may call demagoguery. 
Demagoguery is propaganda in the service of unworthy 
political ideals. What counts as demagoguery therefore 
depends on moral and political facts.” (68)  Stanley then 
acknowledges that the worthiness of political ideals is 
controversial, but given the book presupposes rather than 
defends a commitment to democracy, “It is therefore safe to 
assume … that the liberal democratic ideals of liberty, 
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humanity, equality, and objective reason are worthy ideals. In 
the case of a liberal democratic state, demagogic speech 
includes speech that uses liberal democratic ideals in the 
service of undermining these ideals. (Ibid.)  
Now it should be fairly clear why that account of 
democratic ideals  may imperil the project of offering a non-
moral argument for democracy. It would not be much of a 
problem if the book’s argument supported a set of moral 
ideals with non-moral considerations. But the worry here is 
that there may be a closer connection between the non-moral, 
epistemic argument and the moralised conception of 
egalitarian democracy it supports. It may be that the non-
moral argument for equality only works within the context of a 
moralised conception of democracy, in which case, why not 
offer a standard moral argument for material equality 
directly?  
Some of Stanley’s claims may lend credence to that worry, 
especially his adoption of a broadly Rawlsian, public reason-
centred understanding of democracy’s value: “In a democracy 
… among the central ideals are normative ideals governing 
public political speech. … one is central: the ideal that John 
Rawls has called ‘reasonableness’.” (81) Rawlsian 
reasonableness is a notoriously controversial notion, 
especially on the Eastern shores of the Atlantic. It combines a 
set of epistemic and moral criteria, ranging from a 
requirement to uphold the uncontroversial findings of science 
to a commitment to treating others with the respect due to free 
and equal citizens. It is the latter aspect of Rawlsian 
reasonableness that is worrisome here. In Stanley’s 
interpretation, reasonableness is about taking all perspectives 
into account by adopting a second-personal attitude:  
Second-personal attitudes thus centrally involve the notions of 
dignity and respect. If the adoption of second-personal attitudes is a 
precondition governing public deliberation in public political 
forums, then speech that is an affront to the dignity of other 
members of society runs counter to these ideals, and hence is the 
kind of speech that one expects to find masked paradigmatically 
by propaganda. (109, emphasis in original) 
But do we really need such a moralised conception of 
democracy for the non-moral argument for material equality 
to kick in? I turn to that question in the next section. 
 
3. 
I want to show that there are at least three possible 
readings of Stanley’s argument for equality, and that only one 
of them falls victim to the worry raised in the previous 
sections. I will label the arguments moral, performative, and 
epistemic. I will then argue that the first is inconsistent with the 
book’s aim, the second is consistent but somewhat 
problematic in other respects, and the third is both consistent 
and most promising. 
The moral argument says that demagoguery is bad for 
democracy because, crudely, it makes us disrespect others by 
not relating to them in a reasonable way (in the Rawlsian, 
moralised sense of ‘reasonable’). As we have seen, the problem 
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here is that this kind of disrespect makes the badness of 
inequality depend on the moral badness of disrespect. In 
which case, why bother with a non-moral argument for 
equality in the first place? 
I labeled—somewhat inaccurately—the performative 
argument after the notion of a performative contradiction. A 
performative contradiction occurs when the propositional 
content of a statement contradicts the presuppositions of 
asserting it. This is roughly analogous to something Stanley 
says about how undermining propaganda works: 
“Undermining propaganda involves a kind of contradiction 
between ideal and goal. It’s an argument that appeals to an 
ideal to draw support, in the service of a goal that tends to 
erode the realisation of that ideal.” (53, emphasis added) This 
is not a moral argument, so it is safe from the worry outlined 
earlier. But I want to suggest that it may suffer from excessive 
intellectualism, at least insofar as the book’s argument is 
intended as a live contribution to pressing political problems. 
By that I mean that politics is largely about muddling through, 
not about avoiding contradictions. Philosophers involved in 
public policy discussions, for instance, often frown at policy-
makers relaxed attitude towards contradictory policy 
measures: “Yes, professor, policy A pulls against the aims of 
policy B, but they are five years apart anyway!”. Letting 
demagoguery flourish may undermine democracy in some 
way, but also be important to it in some other way — some 
way I am not going to explore here, as I am merely interested 
in highlighting the possibility. In fact, to be fair, Stanley does 
not argue that demagoguery destroys democracy, but only 
that it is a risk factor for it. But that does not in and of itself 
provide a conclusive argument for equality, which one may 
take to be the book’s aim. In politics we trade off risk factors 
against prospected benefits and other risks, and hope for the 
best. So this performative argument is not a problem for the 
structure of Stanley’s argument (unlike the moral one), but it 
does establish the book’s desired conclusion. Admittedly it is 
hard to see exactly what kind of argument would establish 
such an ambitious conclusion. The more important point here 
is that the performative argument is unlikely to have much 
political salience. But it is a strong argument for the 
philosophy seminar room. 
The epistemic argument hones in on another reading of the 
claim that demagoguery imperils the quality of democracy, 
namely one focused on the epistemic properties of democratic 
deliberation: “Propaganda that is presented as embodying an 
ideal governing political speech, but in fact runs counter to it, 
is antidemocratic. It is antidemocratic because it wears down 
the possibility of democratic deliberation. Such propaganda is 
demagoguery.” (82-3) And further: “Flawed ideological beliefs 
corrode rational debate.” (86) So the idea here is to understand 
the quality of democracy as concerned with a non-moralised 
account of collective decision-making quality. This is a type of 
part-empirical and part-conceptual argument recently 
advanced most prominently by Hélène Landemore (2012), 
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among others.6  Landemore makes a powerful case for the 
epistemic advantages of collective decision-making (under 
certain conditions). In fact Stanley refers to Landemore’s work 
(90), though in that passage he assimilates her argument to the 
far more moralised epistemic case for democracy offered by 
David Estlund (2008), who stresses the moral ills of rule by 
experts. Focusing more narrowly on the purely epistemic case 
for a democratic deliberation untainted by demagoguery 
would assuage the moralism worry we discussed in section 2. 
And it would resonate with Stanley’s already fairly 
streamlined version of reasonableness as an epistemic 
requirement (108ff, 122), as well as with his anti-technocratic 
and anti-authoritarian critique of expert rule (40). 
On this epistemic reading of the book’s core argument the 
point of democracy would be to maximally equalise the 
empowerment of each citizen. Crudely, democracy’s 
distinctiveness is its ability to diffuse power, rather than its 
instantiation of some moral ideal. Democracy is a tool for 
power-sharing, for achieving stability – all distinctly political 
rather than moral values.7  
Does jettisoning the moral argument have a cost, though? 
Setting aside the worry flagged above, that depends on one’s 
overall methodological commitments in political philosophy. 
One may think that showing the congruence between one’s 
first order political position and some appealing moral, pre-
political values is a plus. Or one may think that reliance on 
pre-political moral commitments does not help in political 
philosophy—it may even hinder one’s case, as moral beliefs or 
intuitions are some of the most ideological distortion-prone 
human practices, ironically enough in this context.8 At any 
rate, by adopting this more realistic epistemic conception of 
democracy none of the politically salient egalitarianism is lost, 
but only the bourgeois liberal moralism of equal respect and 
Rawlsian reasonableness. Good riddance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 For a critique see Brennan (2016). 
7 I defend this distinction in Jubb and Rossi (2015). 
8 I defend this claim in Rossi (2016) and Prinz and Rossi (2017). 
 7 
References 
Brennan, J., 2016. Against Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Estlund, D., 2008. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical 
Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Jubb, R. & Rossi, E., 2015. Political Norms and Moral Values. 
Journal of Philosophical Research, 40: 455-458. 
Landemore, H., 2012. Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective 
Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Prinz, J. & Rossi, E., 2017. Political Realism as Ideology 
Critique. Critical Review of Social and International Political 
Philosophy (forthcoming). 
Rossi, E. & Sleat, M., 2014. Realism in Normative Political 
Theory. Philosophy Compass, 9/10: 689-701. 
Rossi, E., 2016. Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics. Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice, 19: 505-520. 
